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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Miracle Cure for Sentencing Disparity
(Caution: Apply Only as Directed)
I. INTRODUCTION
[Jiudges vary widely in their explicit views and "principles"
affecting sentencing; they vary, too, in the accidents of birth and
biography generating the guilts, the fears, and the rages that
affect almost all of us at times and in ways we often cannot
know It is unnecessary, though not irrelevant, to frighten
ourselves with the statistical probability and direct personal
knowledge that some percentage of judges may be psychotic. It
is disturbing enough that a charged encounter like the sentencing
proceeding, should turn so arbitrarily upon the variegated
passions and prejudices of individual judges.'
In an effort to remedy the previously non-directed criminal
sentencing process, 2 the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19841
empowered the United States Sentencing Commission4 to create the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 which became effective November
1, 1987 The Act called for guidelines that would fairly and effec-
tively advance the basic purposes of criminal pumshment: deterring
I Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (discussing the
lack of guidance regarding the weight given factors m sentencing decisions).
2 See generally id.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat.
1837, 2017-34 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter
The Act].
4 Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission and instructed the
members to write the Sentencing Guidelines by April, 1987. The guidelines were to take
effect six months later unless Congress passed a contrary law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1990).
The president appoints the Commission's seven voting members with the advice and consent
of the Senate. At least three of the Commission's voting members must be judges appointed
under article III of the United States Constitution. The two non-voting, ex officio members
are the Attorney General (or his authorized representative) and the chairperson of the
United States Parole Commssion. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1990).
1 United States Sentencing Comm'n Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1988)
[hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines]. The Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 3.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
crime, incapacitating offenders, providing just punishment, and
rehabilitating offenders.
6
The United States Sentencing Commission, composed of seven
voting and two nonvoting, ex officio members, 7 took on the task
of developing Sentencing Guidelines aimed at setting out appro-
priate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.
8
The completion and implementation of the Sentencing Guide-
lines undoubtedly is commendable, however, it appears that the
Commission is just begiming its trek toward the construction of a
fair, effective and workable sentencing system.9 The implementa-
tion and revision of the Sentencing Guidelines will not be a smooth
and easy ride; rather, the unfavorable conditions that are an in-
herent facet of terra incognito inevitably will arise.10
The Supreme Court, recognizing the confusion that the guide-
lines sparked among the federal district courts, granted certiorari
before judgment by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Mis-
tretta.i The Court disposed of two attacks on the constitutionality
of the guidelines. First, the Court found no excessive delegation
of legislative power under the "intelligible principle" test 12 because
the "delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission [is]
sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional require-
6 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a)(i)-(2) (1990).
7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Introduction to Federal Sentencing Guidelines (West Supp.
1990); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1990).
9 The guidelines are effective, and their constitutionality was upheld in United States
v. Mistretta, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 647, 675 (1989). However, some case law suggests that the
guidelines may present a new issue for convicted offenders on appeal. See, e.g., United
States v. DeLuna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Spraggins, 868
F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the application of the guidelines and the
possibility of appeal, see infra notes 60-110 and accompanying text.
10
The Comnission emphasizes that it views the guideline-writing process as
evolutionary. It expects, and the governing statute anticipates, that continuing
research, experience, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions to
the guidelines by submission of amendments to Congress. To this end, the
Commission is established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing prac-
tices in the federal courts throughout the nation.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Introduction (West Supp. 1990).
- Mistretta, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. at 647 (delegation of powers to the Sentencing Com-
mission was not a violation of constitutionally mandated separation of powers).
12 J. W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (The
intelligible principle test is stated as follows: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
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ments.' ' 3 Second, the Court decided that no violation of separation
of powers existed because the Constitution does not prohibit Con-
gress from procuring the wisdom and experience of the judiciary
m an effort to create policy that is uniquely within the ambit of
the Judicial Branch. 14 After Mistretta, several federal district courts
nevertheless have held. the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. 5
In United States v Martinez-Ortega,16 the district court held the
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, stating that the guidelines
deny due process by preventing offenders from receiving individ-
ualized sentences. This and smilar cases illustrate that the Mistretta
7
decision answered only part of the question concerning the consti-
tutionality of the guidelines.' 8
Post-Mistretta attacks on the guidelines have been aimed largely
at their application in a particular case 9 or the reasonableness of
3 Mistretta, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. at 655.
Id. at 675.
'5 United States v. Martinez-Ortega, 684 F Supp. 634 (D. Idaho 1988) (holding
guidelines deny due process by preventing defendants from receiving individualized sen-
tences); United States v. Ortego-Lopez, 684 F Supp. 1506 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en banc)
(mechanical application and narrow guideline ranges violate due process); United States v.
Elliot, 684 F Supp. 1535 (D. Colo. 1988) (guidelines deny an individualized sentence by
limiting the court's article III discretion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1951 (1990); United States
v. Brodie, 686 F Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1988) (gudelines unconstitutional as they limit material
relevant to sentencing).
11 684 F Supp. 634 (D. Idaho 1988).
17 U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
,1 Mistretta did not address a due process argument, hence the district courts' findings
that the guidelines are unconstitutional as violating due process do not conflict with
Mistretta's rationale.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1988) (defendant,
convicted for entering the United States after a previous deportation, argued for a favorable
resolution of which sentencing gudelines range applied to the offense); United States v.
Betancourt, 868 F.2d'1410 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendant, convicted of conspiring to transport
stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, was not a minor or rmmmal participant for purposes
of Federal Sentencing Gidelines); United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797 (5th Cir.
1989) (defendants appealed finding that throwing away gun constituted obstruction of justice
for purposes of increasing offense level under Sentencing Guidelines). See FED. R. Cmm.
P 35:
(a) Correction of Sentence on Remand. The court shall correct a sentence
that is determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to have been imposed
in violation of law, to have been imposed as a result of an incorrect application
of the sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case
to the court-
(1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the findings of the
court of appeals; or
(2) for further sentencing proceedings if, after such proceedings, the
court determines that the original sentence was incorrect.
The standard of review for incorrect application requires that the sentence was clearly
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the sentence.20 Although the guidelines provide basic application
instructions, 21 incorrect application is possible. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(a) provides for resentencing upon "incorrect
application" of the Guidelines or "unreasonable" departure from
the Guidelines. 22 Ideally, the Sentencing Guideline Manual repre-
sents a "recipe" for concocting the sentence an offender will serve.
However, the new sentencing law allows for some judicial discre-
tion; therefore, the sentence an offender receives may not be the
same among jurisdictions.
This Note focuses on the application of the guidelines and
provides specific examples for illustrative purposes. The sections
of the guidelines that are considered in all cases regardless of the
offense, such as substantial assistance,23 acceptance of responsibil-
ity,24 criminal history,25 and general departure provisions, 26 are
emphasized in an effort to reveal the magnitude of "leftovers"
from the old sentencing system. These "leftovers" provide danger-
ous weaponry with which one may attack and possibly defeat the
basic congressional objectives of the Sentencing Guidelines. 27
Problems with the old, unstructured sentencing system revolved
mainly around two concepts: disparity in sentencing and dishonesty
in sentencing. Under the prior system, similar offenders could
receive grossly disparate sentences for similar conduct. For exam-
ple, "punishments for identical cases could range from three years
to twenty years imprisonment. '"u Congress sought uniformity of
sentencing in developing the guidelines. 29 Congress also planned to
alleviate some of the uncertainty in sentencing by calling for hon-
esty in sentencing. Under the old system, the possibility of parole
acted as a "wild card" in determining the actual time an offender
would serve because early release by the parole commission was
erroneous; however, the standard for review of a departure asks only whether the departure
was reasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(3).
Id. See United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 177 (1989); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989); and United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
22 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § IBI.I (West Supp. 1990).
2 FED. R. Cnim. P 35(a).
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 5K1.1 (West Supp. 1990).
24 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3El.1 (West Supp. 1990).
Id. at § 4Al.1
Id. at § 5K2.0.
27 See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
21 Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HoFsA , L. REv. 1, 5 n.25 (1988).
29 See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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"likely but not inevitable." 30 Under the new guidelines, uncertainty
no longer exists because the possibility of parole is eliminated; each
offender serves his entire sentence.
Following the introduction, part two of this Note discusses the
foundation for the guidelines, including the basic goals Congress
sought to achieve upon enacting the new sentencing law. 3' Part
three provides an explanation of how the guidelines work in ap-
plication, walking the reader through the application instructions. 32
Part four critically examines the current case law, focusing on
departures based on the criminal history category 33 and the sub-
stantial assistance to authorities category 14 Part five analyzes the
overwhelming possibilities the guidelines present for mampulation,
as well as the implications thereof.3 - Finally, this Note concludes
that the Guidelines are far from polished, but with careful appli-
cation and a conscious regard of congressional objectives by the
sentencing courts, the guidelines are the beginning of a fair and
efficient federal sentencing system.3
6
II. BASIC FOUNDATION FOR FORMULATING
=H NEw SENTENCING SYSTEM
A. Congressional Objectives in Enacting the New Sentencing
Law
Most agree that the old federal sentencing process lacked struc-
ture and form. Many believed, however, that a structured sentenc-
ing system would cause conflicts as well.37 In analyzing the old
sentencing system, Congress used three main areas as focal points
for creating the new sentencing law Congress focused on honesty
in sentencing, uniformity in sentencing, and proportionality in
sentencing to achieve the goal of increasing the criminal justice
30 Breyer, supra note 28, at 4.
" See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 60-110 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 127-51 and accompanying text; 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4AI.3 (West
1990).
, See infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text; 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 5K1.l (West
1990).
, See infra notes 171-216 and accompanying text.
'6 See mfra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
1, See generally Frankel, supra note 1; Breyer, supra note 30; Robinson, A Sentencing
System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1987).
1990-91]
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system's ability to reduce crime through fair and effective means. 38
Congress sought to alleviate much of the uncertainty of sen-
tencing under the old law.by focusing on "honesty -39
Congress meant to end the previous system whereby a judge might
sentence an offender to twelve years, but the Parole Commssion
could release him after four. Since release by the Parole Com-
ussion was likely but not inevitable, this system sometimes
fooled the judges, sometimes disappointed the offender, and often
usled the public. Congress responded by abolishing parole.4
The abolition of parole provided the sentencing system with "hon-
esty" because all sentences under the new law are determinate4'-
offenders serve the sentence handed down by the court.42
*The second objective Congress sought is uniformity 43 Unifor-
mity is a critical factor in fair sentencing because it provides
consistency," predictability, 45 and public respect." Uniformity nar-
rows the gap in sentences imposed by different judges for similar
criminal conduct by similar offenders. 47
Proportionality in sentencing, i.e., different sentences for cnm-
inal conduct of different severity, is Congress's third objective.4
3" Introduction to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp.
1990).
" S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADmN. NEws 3182, 3237, 3239.
10 Breyer, supra note 28, at 4.
4' Under the old law, sentencing was indeterminate, and an offender could never be
sure how much time he would spend incarcerated. E.g., United States v. Addomzio, 442
U.S. 178, 188-90 (1979) (judge cannot predict when offender will be released, Parole
Commission is in the best position to determine release date); see also note 32 and accom-
panying text.
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1990). The offender serves the entire sentence he receives
with the exception of the possibility of 54 days of "good time" per year after the first
year. Id.
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1990):
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
See also Frankel, supra note 1, 15-17 (efforts toward reform have been directed at improving
judicial competence in sentencing).
" The old law caused wide disparity among different judges in treating similar cases.
Breyer, supra note 28, at 5 n.26. "The region in which the defendant is convicted is likely
to change the length of time served from approximately six months more if one is sentenced
in the South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in Central California. " Id.
,1 Robinson, supra note 37, at 8 and n.34 (stating that sentences must be predictable
to enhance deterrence).
46 Id. at 8-10.
4 See supra notes 28-29.
43 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1990).
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At first glance, uniformity and proportionality appear to be logi-
cally interwoven. 49 In reality, however, tension exists between the
two objectives making it difficult simultaneously to achieve both
goals. In order to perfect uniformity, the criminal justice system
would have to be based on broad offense categories. For example,
robbery might be a category and all offenders would serve five
years. On'the other hand, to perfect proportionality, categories
would be eliminated, and each offender's sentence would be tailor-
made. In attempting to achieve uniformity and proportionality, the
Commission compromised, resulting in integration of both goals
but perfection of neither goal.
In the end, there is no completely satisfying solution to this
practical stalemate. The Comnmssion has had to simply balance
the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple, categorization
[uniformity] and detailed, complex subcategonzation [proportion-
ality], and within the constraints established by that balance,
minimze the discretionary powers of the sentencing court. Any
ultimate system will, to a degree, enjoy the benefits and suffer
from the drawbacks of each approach.:
B. Real Offense v Charge Offense System
The first step for the Commission was to decide whether to
base the guidelines on "real offense" sentencing or "charge of-
fense" sentencing. "Real offense" sentencing determines the sen-
tence by the conduct of the defendant, "regardless of the charges
for which he was indicted or convicted." 5' All identifiable conduct
is considered with real offense sentencing; the conduct does not
have to satisfy the statutory elements of a crime. In contrast,
"charge offense" sentencing examines "the conduct that consti-
tutes the elements of the offense with which the defendant was
charged and of which he was convicted." ' 52 Charge offense sen-
tencing overlooks conduct that is not a statutory element of the
4 Robinson, supra note 37, at 9 ("The corollary to treating meaningfully different
cases differently is treating similar cases similarly. This corollary is not only logical but also
is a goal founded in the purposes of sentencing."). But see 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp.
1990).
" 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1990).
, Id. A pure real offense system sentences on the basis of the identifiable conduct.
A pure charge offense system overlooks some conduct that does not constitute a statutory
element of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted.
s2 Id.
1990-91]
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offense. At the outset,. the Commission sought to develop a real
offense system. Practical considerations forced the Commssion to
abandon the effort to create a pure real offense system. A pure
real offense system would have "required the Commission to decide
precisely which harms to take into account, how to add them up,
and what kinds of procedures the courts should use to determine
the presence or absence of disputed factual elements. '5 3 Based on
these, concerns, the Commission decided that a fair and efficient
pure or modified real offense system could not be devised, and
turned to a "charge offense" system.
54
Although the Commission turned away from a real offense
system, the charge offense system is not pure. It includes some
non-statutory, "real" elements, 5  such as the defendant's role in
the offense and some victim-related adjustments. The Commission
commented that, in the federal criminal system, the difference
between a real and a charge offense system is not critically
significant5 6 because "the conduct that an indictment charges ap-
proximates the real and relevant conduct in which the offender
actually engaged.
' 57
The ultimate approach necessarily intermingles elements of a
charge offense system and a real offense system. The Commission
noted that there would be few instances that compel a court to
examine "particular real facts that will make a difference to the
sentence." 58 The Commission further commented that "a sentenc-
ing court may control any inappropriate manipulation of the in-
dictment through use of its power to depart from the specific
guideline sentence." '59
11 Id., see Robinson, supra note 37, at 11, where the author states the following:
[A] comprehensive sentencing -system may reduce the number of guilty pleas
if it is a "real offense" sentencing system. Unless it provides some explicit
benefit for a guilty plea, a real offense system may reduce the incentive to
plead guilty. Even a slight reduction in the percentage of pleas would cause a
significant increase in the percentage of trials.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1990).
11 Id. First, the Comrmssion wrote guidelines that are "descnptive of generic conduct"
ratherthan limited stnctly to statutory language. Second, through "specific offense char-
actenstics and adjustments," the guidelines necessarily recognize some real offense elements,
such as role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken.
m Id. But see Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv 733, 757
(commenting that "real offense" sentencing would serve as a control on prosecutonal
sentencing power).
17 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1990).
59 Id.
19 Id. If a court departs, it follows that "particular real facts" must be considered.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. General Application Instructions
The Sentencing Guidelines Manual includes "Application
Instructons"' 60 that provide step-by-step directions to assist the
Court in reaching an appropriate sentence. It may appear that
determining a guideline range would be a simple mechanical act;
however, Judge Carl Rubin commented that the new sentencing
law offers "guidelines, not a computer exercise," implying that
the sentencing process is tedious and continues to require discre-
tion.
6'
The application instructions are set out in the gidelines fol-
lowing the introduction. 62 Although the instructions are somewhat
mundane, their importance is substantial as they prevent backslid-
Ing into the old system, which was riddled with sentencing dispar-
ity Specifically, the Commission's three goals of honesty,
unifornmty, and proportionality could be sacrificed inadvertently
by judges who choose to deviate from the guidelines, despite the
instructions. For example, Judge J Owen Forrester, speaking about
the effect of the guidelines on judicial discretion, opined
I am persuaded there is no way to limit discretion and
accommodate all of the interests our society wants. You can't
Apparently, the Commission did not perceive vast use of the departure power; however,
case law suggests otherwise. See infra notes 118-70 and accompanying text.
Introduction to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 1BI.1 (West
Supp. 1990).
61 Address by Chief Judge Carl Rubin, United States Distnct Court, Southern District
of Oluo, at a seminar, The Lawyers Guide to the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines
They're Here to Stay, Cincinnati and Federal Bar Associations (July 1989) (commenting on
the Sentencing Guidelines).
Chapter Two of the Act includes the guideline section. The guideline section in
Chapter Two is determined by reference to § 1BI.2, Applicable Guidelines, which sets out
the method to apply the guidelines to all offenses. The base offense level, given under the
appropnate statute of conviction, is adjusted by any applicable specific offense character-
istics. Adjustments from Chapter Three are then applied. For example, an adjustment
relating to the victim's role may be made: If there are multiple counts, the above steps are
repeated for each count. Chapter Three aids in grouping the counts and adjusting the
offense level. The defendant may or may not get an Acceptance of Responsibility adjust-
ment. The result, at this point, is the total offense level. Next, Chapter Four specifies
categories and adjustments for criminal history. The total offense level and the criminal
history category provide the guideline range through the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five.
Sentencing requirements and options, such as probation, are listed m Chapter Five to
determine the particular guideline range. Finally, Chapter Five lists Specific Offender
Charactenstics, Departures, and policy statements that might help in imposing sentence.
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stay within the guidelines and manipulate them that much. But
you can, I think, in the average case probably double or triple
the sentence if you choose to..63
Sentencing Commission member Paul Robinson, in contrast,
alluded to the use of a computer to aid in the technical procedural
requirements of sentencing: "Indeed a sentencing system may avoid
most complexity in application by utilizing a microcomputer soft-
ware program that asks a series of questions, performs the neces-
sary calculations, and prints a report that displays the resulting
sentence options and how they were determined." 64
The illusion of a simple formula to determine a particular
offender's sentence is quickly dispelled by the techmcal procedural
requirements; the basic offense level, set out by the statute under
which a defendant is convicted, is the only step that possibly could
be viewed as simplistic and analogous to a computer exercise.65
B. Procedural Analysis of the Application Instructions
Examples of the guidelines' application provide a basic under-
standing of how the guidelines work.66 Each offense determines a
base offense level, which is then adjusted according to the specific
offense characteristics set out in the offense guideline.67 For ex-
ample, the offense of "robbery" 6 has a designated base offense
level of 20.69 Thereafter, if the dollar amount of the loss exceeds
$10,000, the level is increased from one to seven points depending
Fulton County Daily Report, Nov. 18, 1988, at 1, 10-14, col. I (emphasis added).
6 Robinson, supra note 37, at 11. Robinson concedes that use of a computer neces-
sarily would be limited to avoid "dehumanization" of the process.
See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 1B1.2 (West Supp. 1990).
As a general rule, the court is to apply the guideline covering the offense
conduct most applicable to the offense of conviction. However, there is a
limited exception to this general rule. Where a stipulation as part of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere specifically establishes facts that prove a more serious
offense or offenses of conviction, the court is to apply the guideline most
applicable to the more serious offense or offenses established.
Id.
66It would be an exercise in futility to talk abstractly of guideline application.
Therefore, examples of application to specific offenses are necessary. Even the examples set
forth are in no way certain due to specific factors perhaps present in one case but absent
in another. Factors relevant to particular cases as wen as differences among cases as a result
of different courts applying the guidelines are discussed infra notes 112-216 and accompa-
nying text.
67 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § iBl.i(a)(b) (West Supp. 1990).
See id. at § 2B3.I.
Id. at § 2B3.1(a).
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on the amount of the loss.20 The next step under specific offense
characteristics of robbery requires the court to determine whether
(1) the property involved was that of a financial institution or a
post office, (2) a firearm was involved, (3) the victim sustained
bodily injury, (4) a person was either abducted or restrained to
facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, and (5)
the object of the conduct was to obtain a firearm, destructive
device, or controlled substance. 71 Any or all of these considerations
could substantially increase the base offense level.
Next, in all offenses, the court must look to Chapter Three,
Part A-Victim Related Adjustments, 72 Part B-Role in the Of-
fense,73 and Part C-Obstruction of Proceedings. 74 For example,
m the robbery illustration, if the defendant knew or should have
known of the victim's vulnerability "due to age, physical or mental
condition," then a two-level increase occurs under victim-related
adjustments. 75
The court next exanunes the defendant's role in the offense.
This part provides for adjustment based on the "size of a crimnal
organization" and the defendant's degree of responsibility in com-
mitting the offense.76 Additionally, this section provides a down-
ward adjustment for a "defendant who plays a part m committing
the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the
average participant." 77 A defendant "recruited as a courier for a
single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs, ' 78
is intended to receive a downward adjustment of two to four
levels, 79 reflecting conduct of lesser culpability Alternatively, if a
defendant is determined to be a "leader" 0 of a crmunal activity,
his offense level is increased by four levels.8'
The commentary indicates when a downward adjustment is
"intended." It is not clear whether the court must give an appro-
70 Id. at § 2B3.1(b)(6).
Id. at § 2B3.1(b)(2)-(5).
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 3A1.1-3AI.3 (West Supp. 1990).
7 Id. at §§ 3B1.1-3BI.4.
7 Id. at § 3CI.1.
71 See id. at § 3A1.I and commentary (A two-level increase for victim vulnerability
would occur "in a robbery where the defendant selected a handicapped victim.").
76 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3B1.1 and commentary (West Supp. 1990).
77 Id. at § 3BI.2 (emphasis added).
78 Id. at § 3B1.1(a) and commentary (distinglusing leadership from mere manage-
ment).
79 Id.
0 Id. at § 3B1.2 and comment 2.
81 Id.
1990-91]
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priate offender a downward adjustment when the circumstances
necessary for the reduction are present. The court should auto-
matically give the reduction to offenders who satisfy section 3B1.2,
Mitigating Role;8 2 this section is not intended to be discretionary
The comments to this section note that this reduction will be used
"infrequently," 83 because it is unlikely that many offenders will
satisfy the section, but not because judges can choose when to
grant the reduction.
Finally, Part C, Obstruction of Proceedings, provides for sen-
tence enhancement if the defendant "willfully interfere[s]" with
criminal proceedings.84 The comments note conduct that may war-
rant an increase for obstruction, such as destroying material
evidence85 and lying on the stand.8 6 The Commission further directs
that in applying this section "suspect testimony and statements
should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant.
'87
The next procedure in the application instructions requires the
court to repeat steps A through C88 if there are multiple counts of
conviction.8 9 This means the court will determine the correct guide-
line section, base offense level, and adjustments. Part D of Chapter
Three9° explains how multiple counts are grouped and how to
adjust the offense level accordingly The Introductory Commentary
of Part D-Multiple Counts91 supplies an explanation of the Com-
mission's intentions regarding multiple counts:
This part provides rules for determining a single offense level
that encompasses all the counts of which the defendant is con-
victed.
The rules in this part seek to provide incremental punishment
for significant additional criminal conduct: The most serious
offense is used as a starting point. The other counts determine
how much to increase the offense level. The amount of the
additional punishment declines as the number of additional of-
2 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3B1.2 and commentary (West Supp. 1990).
" Id.
" 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3Cl.i (West Supp. 1990).
,s Id. at comment (1)(a).
Id. at comment (1)(c).
Id. at comment 2.
" See supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ iBi.i(d), 3DI.i (West Supp. 1990) (Procedure for Deter-
mmng Offense Level on Multiple Counts).
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3Dl.1-3DI.5 (West Supp. 1990).
91 See id., Introductory Commentary.
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fenses increases.
Some offenses that may be charged in multiple-count indict-
ments are so closely intertwined with other offenses that convic-
tion for them ordinarily would not warrant increasing the guideline
range.92
Section 3D.1 lists the following as the procedure for deter-
mning an offender's offense level on multiple counts:
(a) Group the counts resulting in convictions into distinct Groups
of Closely-Related Counts ("Groups") by applying the rules spec-
ified in § 3D1.2; (b) determine the offense level applicable to
each group by applying the rules specified in 3D1.3; and (c)
determine the combined offense level applicable to all Groups
taken together by applying the rules specified in § 3D1.4.93
The Commission intended that "[a]ll counts involving substan-
tially the same harm' 94 be grouped together in accordance with
section 3D1.2. This section sets out when counts involve substan-
tially the same harm. Counts should be grouped together, for
example, "when counts involve the same victim and the same act
or transaction"95 and "when counts involve the same victim and
two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal
objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.. "9
Illustrative is a conviction for one count of assault with intent to
commit murder97 and one count of assault with a dangerous
weapon9" for attacking one victim on a single occasion. Section
3D1.2 provides that these counts must be grouped together because
they involve the same victim and the same act or transaction. 99
Counts may involve the same victim but not be part of the same
act or transaction and, therefore, they are not grouped together
under section 3D1.2(a). Suppose a defendant is convicted of two
counts of postal burglary for burglarizing the same post office on
two different occasions; since the defendant committed the offense
92 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3DI.I-3DI.5, and Introductory Commentary (West Supp.
1990).
, Id. at § 3D1.I.
Id. at § 3DI.2.
91 Id. at § 3DI.2(a).
9Id. at § 3DI.2(b).
97 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (West Supp. 1990).
" Id. at § 113(c).
" 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3D1.2, comment 3 (West Supp. 1990).
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on two different occasions, the offenses are not grouped together.
After the court determines whether counts are grouped together
pursuant to section 3D1.2, the court then determines the offense
level applicable to each group of Closely-Related Counts'00 and
finally determines the combined offense level.10' The resulting com-
bined offense level is the level that the court utilizes in deternminng
the appropriate pumshment. 10 2 The combined offense level, how-
ever, is not the ultimate basis for punishment: 0 3 "[tihe combined
offense level is subject to adjustments from Chapter Three, Part
E (Acceptance of Responsibility) and Chapter Four, Part B (Career
Offenders and Criminal Livelihood)."'04
At this point, the court is in the final stages of imposing a
sentence. After the court determines whether the final adjustments
apply, it may consider policy statements or commentary'05 in the
guidelines that warrant further manipulation of the sentence.' °6 At
this stage, the offender may receive a reduction in sentence,'07 an
increase in sentence, 0 8 or both,' °9 depending on the relevant facts
of a particular case. 10
I- Id. at § 3D1.3.
101 Id. at § 3D1.3.
'1 Id. at § 3D1.5.
103 Id. and Commentary.
10, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3E1.1 (West Supp. 1990). The application of Chapter Three
is discussed more thoroughly infra notes 177-95, and Chapter Four, Part B is discussed
infra notes 127-51.
101 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5H1.1-5H.10 (West Supp. 1990) (consideration of certain
specific offender characteristics, if relevant to "the nature, extent, place of service or other
incidents of an appropriate sentence"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d); 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4,
§§ 5K1.I, 5K1.2, 5K2.0-5K2.15 (West Supp. 1990). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), the sen-
tencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guide-
line. The court must articulate the reasons for a departure, and there must be an "aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)-(c).
106 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5HI.1-5H1.10 (West Supp. 1990). See infra notes 112-216
and accompanying text for examples of departures from the sentencing guidelines.
10 A defendant's sentence may be reduced under 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 5KI.1,
Substantial Assistance to Authorities, discussed infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text.
WI0 A defendant's sentence may be increased substantially as a result of his criminal
history. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4AI.1 (West Supp. 1990). Furthermore, if the defendant is
determined to be a "career offender," his increase is 12 or more points which greatly
impacts his sentence. Id. at § 4BI.1; see also zd. at § 5, Sentencing Table.
109 Adjustments upward or downward from the total sentence level are independent of
each other. See supra notes 107 and 108.
110 The final stage of determimng an appropriate sentence considers particular facts of
an offender's conduct. Congress directed the Commission to consider relevant factors in
determimng a sentence. Additionally, § 5K2.0 allows departure when the Commission has
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The last phase of the sentencing procedure is the most amor-
phous."' For this reason, it is no longer helpful to look at the
application instructions and bare guideline sections. Current case-
law dealing with the last phase is discussed and analyzed in the
following section.
IV CURRENT CASELAW" RESULTS UNDER
=H NEW SENTENCING LAW
A. Does the New Sentencing Law Meet Congressional Goals?
One federal judge commented that he thought the guidelines
were unnecessary, but stated "they are here now, so prosecutors,
defense attorneys and judges should work together to make them
somewhat predictable, but anything humans do is not going to be
totally equal. ' 2 "Predictability" may be one of the largest prob-
lems within the guidelines; it may also be a problem that is often
ignored.13 The potential lack of predictability undermines um-
formity, one of the Commission's most desired objectives."
4
Before the new sentencing law, an offender's sentence could
vary based on an intangible factor such as geographical location."15
not accounted adequately for a specific offender's conduct. This seems to directly oppose
Congress' prediction that there will be few instances that compel a court to examine
"particular real facts." See supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also Introduction to
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A..app. 4 (West Supp. 1990).
"I The court must determine whether "adjustments" are applicable and further whether
departure is warranted. Tis part of the procedure may be the greatest pitfall of the
guidelines. Adjustments and departures are discussed in greater detail, infra notes 112-216
and accompanying text.
112 Address by Judge Herman J. Weber, U.S. District Court (S.D. Ohio), at a seminar,
The Lawyer's Guide to the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines. They're Here to Stay,
Cincinnati and Federal Bar Associations (July 1989) (commenting on the federal sentencing
guidelines).
M' See Introduction to Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, comment 2 (West
Supp. 1990) ("The Commission emphasizes that it views the guideline writing process
as evolutionary. It expects that continuing research, experience and analysis will result
in modifications and revisions to the guidelines through submission of amendments to
Congress.").
M1 Id. at comment 3 ("The greater the number of decisions required and the greater
their complexity, the greater the nsk that different courts would apply the guidelines
differently to situations that, in fact, are similar, thereby reintroducing the very disparity
that the guidelines were designed to reduce.").
M2 See Breyer, supra note 28 ("ITIhe region in which the defendant is convicted is
likely to change the length of time served from approximately six months more if one is
sentenced in the South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in Central California. ").
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"Intangibles" that affected sentencing before the guidelines were
enacted still haunt the sentencing process under the new sentencing
law 116 The Commission instructed sentencing courts "to treat each
guideline as carving out a 'heartland', a set of typical cases em-
bodying the conduct that each guideline describes. ' 117 By allowing
the sentencing courts to carve the "heartland," the Commission
gave the courts discretion without guidance-resulting in continual
uncertainty and non-uniformity in sentencing.
B. Departures from the Sentencing Guidelines
This section focuses on departures from the Sentencing Guide-
lines, with special emphasis on departures based on Chapter Four,
Criminal History," 8 and on Chapter Five, Substantial Assistance
to Authorities.119 The Policy Statement of Guideline section 5K2.0
states that "the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside
the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds
'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission in formulating the guidelines. "',120 The language of
this section is vague causing a range of interpretations among
sentencing courts, which results in a lack of umformity 121
In United States v Bethancurt,'2 the court noted that "since
the Commission has already considered all but the most esoteric
"I See United States v. Diaz, 874 F.2d 43, 52 (ist Cir. 1989) ("There appears to be
some inherent tension in the guidelines themselves as to the extent to which departure is
perrmssible."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1990) (permitting the court to depart from a
guideline-Specified Sentence); Sentencing Guidelines, Chapter 1, Part A - Introduction, 6
("[I]n principle, the Comrmssion, by specifying that it had adequately considered a particular
factor, could prevent a court from using it as grounds for departure. In this initial set of
guidelines, however, the Cominussion does not so limit the court's departure powers.").
"I Instead of leaving sentencing courts to "carving out a heartland," the Commission,
through the guidelines, should have designated the "heartland" as well as the boundaries.
Chief Judge Rubin noted this problem in commenting on the lack of "guidance," and
further noted that all Mistretta means is "it's [the guidelines are] legal." See Rubin, supra
note 61.
1 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4A1.3 (West Supp. 1990).
n9 Id. at § 5Kl1.
1-' 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Some defense attorneys view the language of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b) as a two-prong test where the conduct must satisfy (I) of a kind, and (2) to a
degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. Seminar,
The Lawyers Guide to the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines They're Here to Stay,
Cincinnati and Federal Bar Associations (July, 1989). The language of § 3553(b), on its
face, states " of a kind, or to a degree " directly contradicting the two-prong test
above. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (emphasis added).
121 See infra notes 122-70 and accompanying text.
122 692 F Supp. 1427 (D.D.C. 1988).
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factors, valid departures are likely to be few in number." 1  The
statutory standard for appellate review is whether the sentencing
court stated reasons for the departure and whether under the facts
of the case the departure is reasonable.' l 4 Since this statutory
standard is very deferential to the sentencing court, l2 most depar-
tures have been upheld despite the Commission's standards as set
out in the policy statement. 126 Although the Commission did not
specifically limit the court's departure power, it is limited inherently
if the court is procedurally correct in its guideline application;
departure is warranted only if the aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance has not been considered adequately by the Comnussion.
1. The Criminal History Category
It appears that a vast number of departures are based on the
"inadequacy" of the Criminal History category 127 In United States
v DeLuna-Trujillo,12 the sentencing court departed upward based
on the inadequacy of the offender's criminal history placement. 29
DeLuna-Trujillo pled guilty to conspiring to possess 200 pounds
of marijuana. The court determined his offense level to be 22130
and his criminal history category to be 11131 "because he has been
-3 United States v. Bethancurt, 692 F Supp. 1427, 1430 (D.D.C. 1988) (emphasis
added).
,2, FED. R. Cram. P 35(a) ("The court shall correct a sentence that is determined on
appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to be unreasonable. ").
"I See generally United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1989); Diaz,
874 F.2d at 49-50; United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748 (5th Cir. 1989).
"2 See Missick, 875 F.2d at 1294 (while not upholding the sentencing court's departure,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that great deference should be given to the sentencing court);
Diaz, 874 F.2d at 43 (deferrng to the lower court's holding that defendant's status as an
important narcotics supplier, pendency of eight trafficking charges against defendant, de-
fendant's use of adolescent or preadolescent children to deliver narcotics, and defendant's
involvement in drug ventures that reaped $10,000 to $15,000 daily justified departure from
the guidelines); Juarez, 866 F.2d at 747 (deferrng to the lower court's holding that posses-
sion of a firearm dunng a drug transaction justified departure from the guidelines). In
determining whether the departure is reasonable, appellate courts assert that sentencing
courts have a "superior feel" for the facts and appellate courts "will not lightly disturb a
decision to depart." Diaz, 874 F.2d at 50.
'2 See generally 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4Al.I-4B1.3; see also United States v. DeLuna-
Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fisher, 868 F.2d 128, 129-30
(5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1989).
I 868 F.2d at 122.
"19 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
13o 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 2Dl.1(c) (West Supp. 1990) (listing the Drug Quantity Table
which increases offender's offense level based on the amount of drugs possessed).
M' Id. at § 4A.LI (sentencing table adjusting the offense level based on crimimal
history).
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convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment for in-
tending to distribute 1,653 pounds of marijuana.' 1 32 The correla-
tion of the offense level and the criminal history category resulted
in a punishment range of 46-57 months. 133 The district court sen-
tenced DeLuna to 72 months imprisonment, stating that "the crim-
inal history category did not adequately reflect the amount of drugs
involved in each offense and did not consider that the prior con-
viction was for the same type of offense.' 34 DeLuna-Trujillo
appealed the departure and the appellate court upheld the sentenc-
ing court's decision based on "the seriousness of the past offense
and the increased likelihood of future criminal acts.1 135 The court
found a likelihood of future criminal acts because of prior convic-
tions for the same type of offense.
36
It is true that the Commission recognized that the criminal
history category would be inadequate in some cases. 37 Guideline
section 4A1.3 states that "[i]f reliable information indicates that
the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seri-
ousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood
that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider
imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guide-
line range.' 138 The Commission's sanctioning of departure based
on cnminal history, at first glance, evidences an intent to place
broad discretion with the sentencing court. However, the Commis-
sion qualifies its authorization by listing information that the sen-
tencing court may use (but is not limited to) in deternumng whether
to depart based on criminal history 139
It is critical to the success of the guidelines that the sentencing
court afford absolute attention to the limiting language' 4° that the
,32 DeLuna, 868 F.2d at 123.
I33 d.
134 Id.
W' Id. at 125.
136 Id.
131 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4AI.3.
133 Id.
139 Id..
(a) prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category.
(b) prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as a result
of independent crimes committed on different occasions;
(c) pnor similar misconduct established by a civil adjudication or by a failure
to comply with an admimstrative order;
(d) whether the defendant was pending trial, sentencing, or appeal on another
charge at the time of the instant offense;
(e) prior similar adult cnminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction.
140 Id.
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Commission places on otherwise permissible departures. Although
the Commission does not purport to list every reason that courts
may consider when departing based on criminal history, it is logical
to conclude that the Commission did not intend courts to mamp-
ulate or disregard the listed reasons.
The DeLuna court deliberately misconstrued the stated reasons
of this section. 141 Section 4A1.3(a) permits a court to consider
"pnor sentence[s] not used in computing the criminal history cat-
egory ,,i42 Subsection (c) permits a court to consider "prior similar
misconduct established by a civil adjudication or by a failure to
comply with an administrative order."'' 43 Additionally, subsection
(e) permits a court to consider "prior similar adult criminal conduct
not resulting in a criminal conviction."' 44
DeLuna-Trujillo's prior conviction was used to compute his
crimnal history category, 45 therefore under section 4A1.3(a) the
sentencing court could not depart based on the prior conviction.'4
DeLuna-Trujillo's prior similar misconduct, distribution of mari-
juana, was not established by a "civil adjudication or by failure
to comply with an administrative order," thus the sentencing court
was barred from departing based on prior similar misconduct under
section 4A1.3(c). 47 If the Commission intended for courts to con-
sider any prior similar rmsconduct then it would not have included
the limiting language. Finally, DeLuna-Trujillo's prior similar adult
criminal conduct did result in criminal conviction, thus preventing
the court from departing based on section 4A1.3(e),' 48 which allows
consideration only of criminal conduct not resulting in a convic-
tion.
The DeLuna court stated as its reason for departure under
section 4A1.3, that "the prior conviction was not taken
- DeLuna, 868 F.2d at 124-25.
142 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4Ai.3 (West Supp. 1990).
143 Id.
'" Id.
141 DeLuna, 868 F.2d at 123 ("The court found DeLuna's criminal history category to
be II because he had been convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment in 1975 for
intending to distribute 1,653 pounds of marijuana.").
'4 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 4A1.3(a) (West Supp. 1990) (specifically states that the court
can use only pnor sentences not used in calculating the criminal history category).
'47 Id. at § 4AI.3(c). The Commission qualifies prior similar misconduct by requiring
that it be "established by a civil adjudication or failure to comply with an administrative
order."
'4" Id. at § 4AI.3(e). If the Commission planned on courts considering any prior similar
criminal conduct then the limiting words, "not resulting in a criminal conviction" would
be absent.
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into consideration in the criminal history category ",149 The
DeLuna court is incorrect; the prior conviction was not only con-
sidered in the criminal history category, but also was the basis for
computing the criminal history level. Even if the sentencing judge
meant to say that the criminal history category did not "ade-
quately" consider the prior conviction, the court is still barred
from departure because the prior sentence was used in computing
the criminal history level in section 4A1.3(a). Ultimately, the crim-
inal history category was adequate in DeLuna-Trujillo's case. Un-
fortunately, neither the sentencing court nor the appellate court
recogmzed the adequate consideration of DeLuna-Trujillo's crimi-
nal history 150
Although departure based on criminal history is only one of
the bases for departure, the above analysis illustrates several points:
(1) a sentencing court can manipulate the departure provisions to
reach a desired result, (2) "invalid" departures may nevertheless
be affirmed on appeal by the "reasonableness" review, and (3)
sentencing courts and appellate courts alike must apply the depar-
ture provisions through meticulous recognition of the Commis-
sion's intentions, revealed in the policy statements and commentary,
in order to allow the Federal Sentencing Law to function in a
uniform fashion.
Up to this point, this section has focused on upward departures
from the guidelines. The guidelines also permit downward depar-
tures under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) if a mitigating circumstance exists
"of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into considera-
tion. "2151
2. Substantial Assistance to Authorities
The following section examines section 5KI.1, Substantial As-
sistance to Authorities,'5 2 in order to determine the level of "assis-
tance" necessary to warrant a downward departure. If a defendant
makes a good faith effort to provide "substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.' 1 53 This
141 DeLuna, 868 F.2d at 124.
,I" DeLuna, 868 F.2d at 125 (the court considered DeLuna's sentence inadequate
because of the excessive amount of marijuana possessed by the defendant and his prior
similar adult criminal conduct).
151 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
112 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5K2.0-5K2.15 (West Supp. 1990).
1" Id. at § 5Ki.l.
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section allows the court to depart from the applicable guideline
range "[u]pon motion of the government.' 1 54 In United States v
Donatiu's the defendant appealed based on no reduction in his
sentence for subtantial assistance under section 5KI.1.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Task Force stopped and
questioned Donatlu in an airport during a routine airport courier
stop. Donatiu consented to a search of his carry-on luggage -and
to the opemng of a package found inside. The package contained
cocaine and the defendant admitted knowledge of the cocaine. He
immediately agreed to cooperate with the DEA agents. Donatiu's
cooperation with the government consisted of (1) revealing the
name of his source and his instructions, (2) making a telephone
call to his source in order to complete the delivery as scheduled,
and (3) attempting to find out who he was to meet and the location
of the meeting. Word of Donatiu's arrest reached Donatiu's con-
spirators, which kept the government from making the controlled
delivery of the cocaine. The court noted that the failure of the
plan was not Donatiu's fault. 5 6 Although it appears that Donatiu
"substantially assisted" authorities, the government did not make
a motion for a downward departure based on his assistance.
57
On appeal, Donatiu asserted that (1) "§ 5Kl.1 violates due
process [if it requires] a government motion before a court
may depart", or (2) "§ 5Kl does not require a government
motion before a court may consider a departure. ,,915 The ap-
pellate court recogmzed that section 5Kl.1 is a policy statement
59
and noted that "policy statements under the guidelines generally
are not binding on courts."' 16 The court further stated,
[I]n the context of departures under the guidelines which are
governed by § 3553(b), the Court must follow § 5Kl.1 even
though it is described by the Commission as a "policy state-
ment" [S]ection 3553(b) . directs courts that they may
only consider the guidelines, the policy statements, and official
commentary in detemuning whether the Sentencing Commission
adequately considered a circumstance for departure. If the Com-
15 Id.
"1 720 F Supp. 619 (N.D. i11. 1989).
"' United States v. Donatiu, 720 F Supp. 619, 621 (N.D. IM. 1989).
Id. at 621.
's' Id.
Departure provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines are policy statements. See 18
U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5K2.0-5K2.15.
,60 Donatiu, 720 F Supp. at 624.
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mission did consider the circumstance m a policy statement, as it
clearly did with a defendant's "substantial assistance" in § 5K1 .1,
the court must follow § 5K1.1 in order to depart.'
61
Based on the court's determination that it must strictly follow
section 5K1.1, it affirmed the sentencing court, holding that de-
parture is not warranted unless the government makes a motion.1 62
The court held that section 5K1.1 must be followed "to the letter"
in keeping with congressional intent1 63 and that departures under
the guidelines are the rare exception rather than the rule.64 The
court that decided the Donatiu case previously had held the guide-
lines unconstitutional prior to the Mistretta decision by the Su-
preme Court. Subsequently, in the Donatiu opimon, the court
stated that "[t]he best way to draw attention to faulty legislation
is to enforce it to the letter. Though many individuals, our federal
system of crimnal justice and the taxpayers will suffer, this re-
gretful suffering should cause a reconsideration. "165 It is un-
fortunate that DeLuna-Trujillo did not reap the benefits of the
"enforce it to the letter" mentality of the Donatiu court, as it
would have worked to his advantage.1
66
The DeLuna'67 and Donatiu161 cases are only isolated examples
of departure application. 69 The case illustrations are beneficial in
that they reveal how vast the differences may be in departure
provision interpretation, thus resulting in harmful disparity among
federal courts. The cases further uncover the haunting discretion
that remains in the federal criminal sentencing process. 70
161 Id., see United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
any departure from the guidelines must be made pursuant to section 5KI.1).
162 Donatiu, 720 F Supp. at 624.
I- See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see also notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
'" Donatiu, 720 F Supp. at 624.
161 Id. at 624 n.2.
' See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text. If the DeLuna court had followed
the Guidelines strictly as did the Donatiu court then DeLuna-Trujillo's sentence would not
have been erroneously increased due to an unreasonable departure.
167 868 F.2d 122.
16 720 F Supp. 619.
169 See, e.g., Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54 (proper for the court to increase defendant's criamnal
history level based on two pending felony convictions and three misdemeanor arrests within
two months of the offense of conviction); United States v. Campbell, 704 F Supp. 661
(E.D. Va. 1989) (a government motion to the court based on the defendant's substantial
assistance was made since the defendant provided information to support a search warrant
and provided a full debriefing in anticipation of trial).
110 The sentencing court maintains broad discretion due to mampulations in guideline
interpretation utilized to reach the desired outcome. See notes 133-35 and accompanying
text.
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V PROGNOSIS OF "DISCRETIONARY" SECTIONS OF THE
GUIDELINES
The prior section discussed the adequacy of the criminal history
and substantial assistance categories in relation to specific case
law '7' This section analyzes adjustments such as acceptance of
responsibility,'72 use of certain information, 73 as well as the general
departure provisions,' 74 by interpreting the language of particular
guideline sections and their accompanying policy statements. This
part serves as a prognosis, exposing Interpretation difficulties in
the form of ambiguities that may defeat congressional objectives
sought in enacting the Sentencing Guidelines. 7 - This section at-
tempts to illustrate the probable continuing disparity in federal
sentences because court discretion has not been actually reduced;
rather, it has been merely camouflaged by the new sentencing
law 176
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
A defendant may procure a tWo-level decrease in his sentence
if he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative accep-
tance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.' 1 77 A
defendant may receive this decrease "without regard to whether
his conviction is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by
the court or jury ",i78 The Acceptance of Responsibility guideline,
section 3El.1, states further that a guilty plea does not ensure the
reduction "as a matter of right.'
1 79
The Commission intended this section to apply to defendants
who demonstrate "sincere remorse."' 8 0 Deternmng when circum-
stances exist that amount to "sincere remorse" is a problem. The
commentary following section 3El.l lists examples of appropriate
7 See supra notes 118-70.
'7 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3EI.I (West Supp. 1990) (discussing adjustments for accep-
tance of responsibility).
173 Id. at § 1BI.8.
74 Id. at §§ 5K2.0-5K2.15.
17, See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
176 See infra notes 177-216 and accompanying text.
'7 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3E1.l(a) (West Supp. 1990).
178 Id. at § 3El.1(b).
'17 Id. at §§ 3E1.I(c), 3El.i(c) comment 3 (noting that a guilty plea "may show some
evidence of acceptance of responsibility. ").
110 Id. (commentary background).
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considerations for use in judging remorse."'1 The last consideration
listed, but the most crucial, is "the timeliness of the defendant's
conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility "182
Timeliness is critical because (1) if the defendant does not
demonstrate remorse "on time" he will be demed the two-level
reduction, and (2) if the defendant does offer valuable information
in an effort to accept responsibility but it is not "on time", thus
disallowing the two-level decrease, the given information may be
used against him.1 3 The guidelines are silent as to the meaning of
timeliness in section 3EI .1.8'4 Language in other sections implies
that the giving of information is timely if it is unknown to the
government, 85 or if it would be helpful to the investigation when
the defendant comes forth with the information. 8 6
For purposes of discussion this Note assumes that the Com-
mission intended timeliness to be measured by what the government
already knows or by the helpfulness to the investigation. For
example, if a defendant in an effort to accept responsibility assists
authorities in the recovery of the "fruits and instrumentalities of
the offense,' '187 the defendant could earn a two-level reduction by
way of section 3E.1.8ss The government also could reject his
efforts as untimely and apply this information to increase his
offense level under specific offense characteristics.'89 Assume the
offender's criminal conduct is tax evasion. Under specific offense
characteristics, in section 2T1.1, a two-level increase is possible.i 9°
Section 2Tl.l(b)(2) calls for a two-level increase if "sophisticated
means were used to impede discovery of the nature or extent of
the offense."19' The commentary states that the enhancement under
section 2T1.l(b)(2) "would be applied for example, where the
defendant used offshore bank accounts, or transactions through
"I Id. at comments l(a)-(g) (for example, voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduct,
or voluntary and truthful admission of involvement in the offense).
182 Id. at comment l(g).
,13 See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 3E1.l (West Supp. 1990).
185 Id. at § IBi.8(b) (entitled "Use of Certain Information" and stating that infor-
mation known to the government before the offender provides it will be used in computing
the guideline range).
186 Id. at comment 1.
'8 Id. at § 3E1.1, comment 1(e).
Id. at § 3E.(a).
18 See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Chapter 2 (pertaining to offense conduct in which most
offenses provide adjustments for specific offense characteristics).
190 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 2T1.l(b) (West Supp. 1990).
"I Id. at § 2TI.I(b)(2).
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corporate shells."' 192 If the defendant produced this information
seeking a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the govern-
ment could reject the offender's information as untimely The
offender's information still would result in a two-level increase
under section 2Tl.l(b)(2)'s specific offense characteristics. 193 If this
information could be used against the defendant to increase his
level, 94 then the cautious defendant will forfeit the possibility of a
two-level decrease knowing the information's range of uses against
him. 9
5
B. Use of Certain Information
Section 1B1.8,' 96 Use of Certain Information, raises the same
concerns as the acceptance of responsibility provision. 97 This sec-
tion provides,
[w]here a defendant agrees to cooperate with the government by
providing information concerning unlawful activities of others,
and the government agrees that self-mcnnnating information so
provided will not be used against the defendan't, then such infor-
mation shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline
range, except to the extent provided in the agreement. 98
This section does not restrict the use of information known to the
government prior to the agreement. 99
Unlike section 3El.1, Acceptance of Responsibility, this section
purports to gather information concerning the unlawful activity of
others. The defendant may wish to assist the government to receive
a reduction under section 5K1.1, Substantial Assistance to Author-
"1 Id. at comment 6.
.93 Id. at § 2Ti.I(b)(2).
' 9 Nothing in § 3E1.1 suggests that information cannot be used against the offender
in other guideline sections.
' The information could be used to increase the offender's sentence under 18 U.S.C.A.
app. 4, §§ 2Tl.l(b), 4A1.3, 51(2.0 (allowing increases for an offender's criminal history,
the specific offense's characteristics and other general departure grounds). See supra notes
127-51 and accompanying text (discussing increases based on offender's criminal history);
see supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text (discussing increases based on general depar-
ture grounds) and supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing increases for the
specific offense characteristics).
19 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § IBI.8 and comments.
19 Id. at § 3E.I.
Id. at § IBI.8(a).
Id. at § 1BI.8(b).
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ities. 200 The timeliness, of assistance is important under section
3E.1 and section 5K.l.
An offender may enter into an agreement with the government
whereby he agrees to cooperate concerning the unlawful activities
of others, 2 1 and the government agrees not to use some self-
incriminating information against the offender. 2 2 Subsection (b)(3)
of section IBI.8 provides that restriction of use shall not be ap-
plicable if "there is a breach of the cooperation agreement." It
follows that if the defendant breaches the cooperation agreement,
the information may be used in determning an applicable guideline
range.
Defense attorneys should determine and alert their clients as to
what constitutes a "breach of the cooperation agreement." Sup-
pose a defendant enters into a cooperation agreement under section
1Bi.8 and then refuses to further assist authorities. 20 3 Does the
refusal to further assist constitute a breach of the cooperation
agreement? Section 5K1.2 states that "a defendant's refusal to
assist authorities in the investigation of other persons may not be
considered as an aggravating factor" to depart upward. 2 4 Despite
section 1Bi.8, once the defendant has executed the agreement to
cooperate, it can be argued that the obtained information may be
used to incriminate the defendant and thus increase is offense
level if he fails to cooperate. If this argument is valid, then the
rationale of sections 1B1.8 and 5K1.2 is circumvented: the govern-
ment can use incruinating information against the defendant, 205
and the use of this information necessarily subjects him to an
increased sentence. 2 6 This effect will cause defendants to be reluc-
tant about entering cooperation agreements with the government,
thus undermining the intent of section 1Bi.8 to encourage offender
cooperation.
- The guidelines do not cross reference these sections.
20 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 1B1.8(a) (West Supp. 1990).
2m Id. Use of information will not be restricted when the government is aware of the
information pnor to the agreement, there is a prosecution for perjury.or there is a breach
of the cooperation agreement. Id. at § 1B1.8(b).
211 The defendant may, for instance, refuse to further assist due to imminent danger
to himself or others.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, at § 5KI.2 (West Supp. 1990).
Id. at § 1BI.8.
20 See id. at § 5KI.2. See also id. at comment 1, 3.
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C. Grounds for Departure
The final focus of ambiguities in guideline language falls on
section 5K2.0, Grounds for Departure.2 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 3553(b) "the sentencing court may impose a sentence out-
side the range established by the applicable guideline. "218 The policy
statement directs that "[wihere the applicable guidelines, specific
offense characteristics, and adjustments do take into consideration
a factor listed in this part, d6parture from the guideline is war-
ranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in
excess of that wich ordinarily is involved in the offense of con-
viction." 9 The Commission noted, "[tihe controlling decision as
to whether and to what extent departure is.warranted can only be
made by the court at the time of sentencing. '210
Section 5K2.0 may be the "Pandora's box" of the Sentencing
Guidelines. If a sentencing court need only determine that a factor
exists "substantially in excess" of the norm, the old sentencing
law's much criticized discretionary aspects are present.21 For ex-
ample if a defendant engages in gambling2e 1 2 the base offense level
is 6.213 The Specific Offense Characteristic provision directs an
increase by six levels "if the offense is committed as part of, or
to facilitate, a commercial gambling operation. ' 21 4 The defendant's
possible offense level rises to 12. According to section 5K2.0, if
the court can identity a factor that is substantially in excess of an
ordinary conviction in this type of gambling, then the court may
depart from the applicable guideline range. If the court determines
that a six-point increase under Specific Offense Characteristics does
Id. at §§ 5K2.0-5K2.15.
Id. at § 5K2.0.
20 Id.
210 Id.
211 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court will review tis
problem m the near future. In United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343 (1990), cert. granted,
U.S., 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990), the court sentenced the defendant to 60 months imprisonment
although the U.S. attorney and the probation officer recommended a sentence of 30-37
months, consistent with the guidelines. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to preserve
the congressional objectives and prevent unreasonable departures by compelling sentencing
courts to adhere strictly to the departure standards.
212 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 2E3.1-2E3.3 (1990) (§ 2E3.1 refers to the crime of engaging
in a gambling business and has a base offense level of 12; § 2E3.2 refers to the crime of
transmission of wagering information and has a base level of 6; § 2E3.3 refers to all other
gambling offenses and has a base level of 6).
213 Id. at.§ 2E3.3.
214 Id. at § 2E3.3(b).
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not reflect the seriousness of the offense, then arguably it could
depart upward based on its perception that the Commission failed
to" adequately consider this circumstance in formulating the guide-
line. 215 If this is true, then widespread disparity among sentences
will undoubtedly continue.
The examples contained in this Note offer only a brief glance
at the guidelines and their possible operational flaws. With critical
analysis by sentencing courts and future modifications of the guide-
lines, some of the more extreme possibilities stated may never
become a reality Certain safeguards are present to prevent such
extreme results. 216 Future analysis and current safeguards may limit
discretion adequately. If discretion is not limited, however, the
desired uniformity will be lost.
CONCLUSION
The Commission undertook a seemingly insurmountable task
in creating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. But the venture is
far from complete as the Commission concedes in its introductory
commentary 217 The guidelines are still an amorphous set of ideas
that have not yet come to full fruition. 218 Although there are "land
mines" dispersed throughout, the guidelines are a start in the
direction of attaimng the congressional objectives of honesty, urn-
formity, and proportionality 219
Congress achieved the first goal of honesty because all sentences
under the new law are determinate. 2 0 Indefinite sentences are no
longer a problem under the guidelines because each offender and
the sentencing judge know how long the offender will be impris-
oned. The success of the next two goals, uniformity and propor-
215 Id. at § 5K2.0. For example, a defendant could be involved in what the court
perceives to be an inordinate commercial gambling scheme. The guidelines do not suggest
methods by which a court could fairly and efficiently determine when a factor exists
"substantially in excess" of the norm. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, § 5K2.0. "[T]he court may
depart-from the guidelines, even though the reason for departure is listed elsewhere
(e.g., as an adjustment or specific offense characteristic). " Id.
216 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1985) (requinng sentencing court to articulate its reasons for
departure from the guidelines).
217 Introduction to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, comment 3
(West Supp. 1990).
211 See Robinson, supra note 37, at 12 (commenting that "[w]e may need to devise a
transitional system that gradually increases the degree of binding effect as confidence grows
in the propriety of the system's results.").
219 See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
no See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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tionality, may be determined by looking at them contemporaneously
Uniformity and proportionality are intertwined so that both cannot
be unequivocally attained; the two concepts are inherent antago-
msts.
221
Congress compromised both concepts in an effort to incorpo-
rate them into the guidelines. A certain amount of uniformity
exists since similar criminal conduct by similar offenders results in
consistent and predictable sentences. On the other hand, propor-
tionality exists in the new sentencing law to allow different sen-
tences for criminal conduct of different severity
Although the guidelines technically attained the congressional
goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality, the victory is
somewhat hollow Since the Commission graciously gave the courts
unbridled departure power,m2 the guideline objectives have been
somewhat sacrificed. Honesty in sentencing will be diluted because
offenders will not be able to predict their sentence length based on
a strict reading of the guidelines. Uniformity will be forfeited since
each court may deviate based on the individual peculiarities before
the bench. Proportionality will also vamsh because, although dif-
ferent conduct will receive different sentences, if each court departs
based on unguided discretion it will not be logically consistent.
The Commission recognized that some would criticize the
guidelines as "overly cautious, [and] as representing too little a
departure from existing practice."22 The Commission is a perma-
nent body and can amend the guidelines annually The Commission
should drastically amend the departure provisions in order to limit
them, and to prevent resurfacing of the ghost of discretion.
The departure provisions2 present a great opportunity to ma-
nipulate the sentencing process even though most other sections
are restrictive. Judges may find that their thirst to deviate from
the given guideline ranges may be quenched through abuse of the
departure provisions. The guidelines are an enormous set of rules
and policy statements; in order to apply the guidelines correctly
and receive their potentially invaluable benefits, greater balance
must be achieved between the guidelines' sections. Each section
should act as a check and balance on the other sections to promote
congressional objectives and prevent unjust sentences. The aboli-
2' See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
2n See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5K2.0 - 5K2.15 (West Supp. 1990).
1" 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, comment 5 (West Supp. 1990).
22 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 5K2.0 - 5K2.15 (West Supp. 1990).
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tion of parole reinforces the offender's need to depend on consis-
tency in the Federal Sentencing System. The Sentencing Guidelines
are only a miracle cure if applied as directed with a narrowed view
of court discretion. If courts persist in exerting too much discretion,
the Cominussion should amend the Sentencing Guidelines. It is only
through continued analyses of the results under the new guidelines,
with the congressional objectives in mind, that the sentencing sys-
tem can be cured.
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